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THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: A STRUCTURAL
OVERVIEW AND AN APPRAISAL OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
JESSE H. CHOPER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The free exercise clause, the second of the two religion clauses in
the first amendment, is the focus of this Article. Since the early
1970's, the Burger Court has either promulgated or specifically re-
affirmed almost all significant aspects of the doctrine surrounding
this constitutional protection for religious freedom. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court, and the Burger Court in particular, has interpreted
the free exercise clause to provide a virtually unique protection for
religion, one that is markedly greater than the security that the
Constitution provides for speech.
The purpose of this Article is four-fold: first, to identify several
distinct kinds of government action that raise significant problems
under the free exercise clause; second, to describe and appraise
what the Burger Court has done with respect to this provision;
third, to indicate a number of serious difficulties that arise from
the Court's pronouncements in this area; and fourth, to suggest a
better approach to resolving some of the problems.
II. NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS IMPLICATING FREE EXERCISE
CONCERNS
The first general type of government action that presents a gen-
uine issue under the free exercise clause is a regulation that has a
secular purpose but that has an effect or impact that conflicts with
the tenets of a particular religion. In this instance, the Court,
drawing on a famous dictum in Cantwell v. Connecticut,1 has dis-
tinguished between "freedom to believe and freedom to act."2
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Research support for
this Article was provided by the Max Weingarten Fund.
1. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
2. Id. at 303.
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A. Laws With a Secular Purpose But an Impact on Religious
Beliefs
Laws that regulate religious beliefs are very unusual. The Court
has said that the Constitution absolutely forbids the federal or
state governments from regulating religious beliefs. Probably the
best illustration is West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette,4 in which several Jehovah's Witnesses challenged the obliga-
tion to salute the flag in public schools as being contrary to their
religious beliefs concerning the worship of graven images.5 The
Court persuasively reasoned that this was an effort by the State to
force someone to embrace or express a belief.'
Barnette did not rest on the free exercise clause, but rather on
the broader first amendment protection of freedom of expression.7
The rationale, however, is the same. It was repeated within the
past decade in Wooley v. Maynard,8 in which the Court considered
the claim of a Jehovah's Witness who did not want his license
plate to bear the New Hampshire state motto, "Live Free or Die." 9
The Court held that the first amendment freedom of speech barred
the State from prosecuting him for covering the motto on his li-
cense plate, reasoning that the law was forcing him to embrace or
express a belief. 10
B. Laws With a Secular Purpose But an Impact on Religious
Actions
The Supreme Court's most significant doctrinal pronouncement
has come with respect to neutral, secular laws that regulate action.
When the impact of such regulations conflicts with the tenets of a
particular religion, by requiring persons to do something that their
religion prohibits or by forbidding them from doing something that
their religion demands, the Burger Court has found an abridgment
3. Id. at 303-04.
4. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
5. Id. at 629.
6. Id. at 633-34.
7. Id. at 634-35.
8. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
9. Id. at 707-08.
10. Id. at 714-15.
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of religious liberty unless the government satisfies what, essen-
tially, is a test of "strict scrutiny." Unless the government can
show an overriding, substantial, compelling, or important interest
that cannot be achieved by some narrower, alternative means, the
individual is constitutionally entitled to an exemption from the
regulation."
A leading Burger Court ruling, Wisconsin v. Yoder,' 2 illustrates
the point. Wisconsin had compulsory education until the age of
sixteen. The Old Order Amish have a religious tenet, which the
Court accepted as a good faith observance of their faith, that holds
that sending Amish children to accredited public schools beyond
the eighth grade would corrupt them, make them too worldly, and
endanger their salvation. In Yoder, therefore, the Amish argued
that they were entitled to an exemption from the compulsory edu-
cation law.13 The Court, in a virtually unanimous decision, agreed.
Weighing all the circumstances, the Court held that the State's in-
terest was not strong enough to require the Amish to engage in
conduct that was contrary to their religious beliefs.' 4
A contrast between the facts in Yoder and a hypothetical situa-
tion substantiates the point that the Constitution protects religion
to a significantly greater extent than almost anything
else-including the freedoms of expression and association, which
we generally believe to be at the core of the democratic process.
Suppose that Mrs. Yoder, the mother of these children, decided to
run for elective office and urged that having her children out of
school for a few months before the end of her campaign, working
for her full time, was critical to her election chances. Suppose fur-
ther that she took her children out of school and that the State
attempted to prosecute her under the same Wisconsin statute chal-
lenged in Yoder. Finally, suppose that Mrs. Yoder then contended
11. With an important qualification discussed shortly, see infra pp. 946-48, I believe that
this is an appropriate approach to this type of free exercise problem. Although refinement of
this special "balancing" method is beyond the scope of this Article, and although I would
substantially restrict the occasions for its use, see Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First
Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579, 597-604, this analysis in my judgment affords reli-
gious freedom the substantive protection it properly deserves.
12. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
13. Id. at 207-09.
14. Id. at 229-34.
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at trial that Wisconsin's compulsory education requirement vio-
lated her freedom of expression and association because running
for elective office is a pristine method of exercising that right. The
Court almost certainly would give less than short shrift to that po-
sition. Thus, if the argument is made under the free exercise
clause, it wins in the Supreme Court, virtually unanimously, yet
when the argument is framed in terms of freedom of expression
and association it appears to be a certain loser.
In addition to Yoder, the other famous decision that illustrates
the Court's doctrinal framework is Sherbert v. Verner."5 That case
involved a Seventh Day Adventist who worked in the textile mills
in South Carolina. Seventh Day Adventists celebrate their Sabbath
on Saturday. The mills had worked five days a week, Monday
through Friday, but then had gone to a six-day week including Sat-
urday. Sherbert had said that she could not work on Saturday be-
cause of her religious beliefs. She had been fired, and she had
sought unemployment compensation.1" The rule was that she could
not get unemployment compensation if she refused "suitable
work. ' 17 Although no textile mill would have employed Sherbert
without requiring Saturday work, the state board had concluded
that she had refused to accept suitable work and thus had denied
her benefits.18 The Supreme Court held that the free exercise
clause requires an exemption from this "suitable work" require-
ment so that she could receive unemployment compensation. 9
III. DEFICIENCIES IN THE BURGER COURT'S APPROACH AND A
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
The Court's decisions in Yoder and Sherbert highlight a major
difficulty with the Court's approach under the religion clauses, one
of both logic and policy. The problem arises from the Burger
Court's interpretation of the other religion clause, the establish-
ment clause. This difficulty is especially the result of the most
15. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Burger Court specifically reaffirmed Sherbert on nearly iden-
tical facts in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
16. 374 U.S. at 399-400.
17. Id. at 400-01.
18. Id. at 401.
19. Id. at 403-06.
[Vol. 27:943
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
significant part of the Court's approach to finding an abridgment
of that provision-the firmly embedded principle that a religious
purpose alone will make a law violative of the establishment
clause.2 0
As a matter of policy, this doctrine casts great doubt on many
deeply ingrained practices in our country. The placement of "In
God We Trust" on coins and currency, for example, seems to have
no real purpose other than a religious one. Moreover, the procla-
mations by almost all our Presidents of national days of
Thanksgiving to "Almighty God" only seem fairly characterized as
having a religious purpose. If one takes seriously the Court's doc-
trine that a religious purpose alone produces a violation of the es-
tablishment clause, these and many other longstanding practices in
our society must be held invalid.
How does the Court deal with this conflict between its doctrine
and established national policies? Although a majority of the jus-
tices have applied this "religious purpose equals invalidity" princi-
ple strictly on several occasions,21 the Supreme Court simply ig-
nores its own articulated test when it wishes to uphold a deeply
engrained national practice that clashes with this doctrine. This
tactic was illustrated vividly in Marsh v. Chambers,22 when the
Court held that Nebraska's payment of $320 per month to a chap-
lain to open each legislative day with a prayer did not violate the
establishment clause.2 s
More directly relevant for purposes of this Article, this principle
is subject to even greater difficulty as a matter of logic, because it
is at war with the Supreme Court's own doctrine under the free
exercise clause. The Court's free exercise clause doctrine not only
permits states to give exemptions to aid religion, but sometimes, as
the Court's decisions in Yoder and Sherbert demonstrate, the rule
requires states to give such exemptions. On the one hand, the
20. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("the statute must have a secular legis-
lative purpose").
21. See, e.g, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (finding the one-minute period of si-
lence for voluntary prayer in Alabama public schools unconstitutional); Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980) (finding the posting of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky public
school classrooms unconstitutional).
22. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
23. Id.
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Court has read the establishment clause as saying that if a law's
purpose is to aid religion, it is unconstitutional. On the other hand,
the Court has read the free exercise clause as saying that, under
certain circumstances, the state must aid religion. Logically, the
two theses are irreconcilable.
How should this conflict be resolved? When should the Court
hold that the free exercise clause requires religious exemption from
an ordinary government regulation? There is a simple principle
that would resolve all issues under the establishment clause and
that would be central in approaching most basic issues under the
free exercise clause. Government action should be held to violate
the establishment clause if it meets two criteria: first, if its purpose
is to aid religion; and second, if it significantly endangers religious
liberty in some way by coercing, compromising, or influencing reli-
gious beliefs.
Under this approach, Yoder was correctly decided. Although an
exemption for the Old Order Amish children did serve an exclu-
sively religious purpose, it did not coerce, compromise, or influence
anyone's religious beliefs. People were not lining up to join the Old
Order Amish so they could get their children out of school before
the age of sixteen. In the absence of proof of this kind, the exemp-
tion posed no danger to religious liberty, even though it served a
religious purpose. Therefore, under my proposed approach, the Su-
preme Court's decision under the free exercise clause did not vio-
late the establishment clause.
Sherbert, however, generates a different conclusion under my
approach. The first part of the test yields the same result, because
the purpose of giving Sherbert the money was solely to assist her
religion. To illustrate, suppose Sherbert had said: "I used to work
in the mills Monday through Friday. When they went to Saturday,
I refused to work that day and was fired. I want unemployment
compensation." When asked why she refused to work on Saturday,
suppose she had responded, "Because I am a working mother with
children in school. Having to be away Monday through Friday
when they come home from school is bad enough. I want to spend
Saturday and Sunday with them. I feel very strongly about this. It
is a central part of my life." When asked if this involved her reli-
gion, suppose Sherbert had replied: "This has nothing to do with
religion." Sherbert would get nowhere in the Supreme Court with
[Vol. 27:943
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the argument that a denial of unemployment benefits under these
circumstances violated her constitutional rights, at least under ex-
isting doctrine. The Court granted an exemption in Sherbert for
religion alone.
The second criterion in my approach, however, yields a different
result because, unlike the exemption in Yoder, the exemption in
Sherbert required South Carolina to use compulsorily raised tax
funds to assist religious ends. Most individuals would agree, in
general, both as a matter of historical intent 4 and of contemporary
values, that one of the principal purposes of the establishment
clause is to prevent government from giving compulsorily raised
tax funds to churches, whether a particular taxpayer agrees with
those churches or disagrees with them. For the government to give
a taxpayer's money to religion, even the religion of that taxpayer's
choice, is a pristine violation of the establishment clause. A tax-
payer's religious freedom is violated when the government forces
support of the taxpayer's own religion, and the violation is even
more egregious when the government forces support of someone
else's religion. That is the consequence when the government dis-
tributes tax funds for religious purposes, in contrast to distribution
for secular purposes, which implicates no such claim even when a
taxpayer does not like the way government spends the money. I
cannot distinguish the payment of funds to Sherbert from the
grant of a million dollars to support the Presbyterian Church,
which most people would agree is an obvious violation of the estab-
lishment clause.
Sherbert involved unemployment compensation to the Seventh
Day Adventist religion, and only for religion. The purpose of the
exemption, therefore, was religious. Further, the compelled com-
pensation abridged religious liberty. Both criteria under my pro-
posed approach for finding an establishment clause violation are
met. In sum, the Court was doubly wrong in Sherbert. Not only
was South Carolina's denial of unemployment compensation to
Sherbert not a violation of the free exercise clause, it was a
24. See, e.g., Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. Pirr. L. REv. 673, 677-78 (1980); Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court:
Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE L. J. 770,
776-77.
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violation of the establishment clause for the Court to require the
State to grant it to her.25
25. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), the Bur-
ger Court case that reaffirmed Sherbert, came close to this position, but did not adopt it.
That case involved a Jehovah's Witness who had been working in a steel foundry in Indiana.
He initially had been engaged in the production of raw steel, but he had been transferred to
the manufacture of tank turrets, and he had quit on the ground that his religion forbade
production of weapons. He then had applied for unemployment compensation, which the
Review Board had denied on the ground that he had quit for a personal reason rather than
for "good cause" in connection with his work. Id. at 710-12. The Supreme Court held that
Sherbert governed this situation, and it reversed the Board's decision on the basis of the
free exercise clause. Id. at 720.
Justice Rehnquist, however, believed that the State's refusal to give Thomas unemploy-
ment compensation did not violate the free exercise clause. Justice Rehnquist argued that
the Indiana rule did not discriminate against Thomas because of his religion. In fact, it
treated him the same as anyone else. Anyone who quit for personal reasons, whether be-
cause of a political objection to the manufacture of weapons, because of an ideological objec-
tion, or otherwise, would be denied unemployment compensation. Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested that a law would violate the free exercise clause only if it singled out religion for
adverse treatment-for example, if it permitted unemployment compensation to a person
who quit his job for any reason except a religious one. See id. at 722-23 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist then argued that the Court's decision conflicted with many of its estab-
lishment clause rulings. In Thomas, the Court, according to Justice Rehnquist, did not sim-
ply permit the State to aid religion, it actually required it to do so. Justice Rehnquist, who
usually dissents from the Court's refusal to permit aid to parochial schools, questioned
whether the Court could square its holding in Thomas with its position that the Constitu-
tion forbids most aid to parochial schools.
The Court, Justice Rehnquist noted, was holding that the Constitution required the gov-
ernment to give Thomas financial support through unemployment compensation because
Thomas should not have to suffer the consequences of doing what his religion required. But,
Justice Rehnquist contended, the Court should consider the situation of children whose reli-
gion requires them to attend not secularly oriented schools, but church-related schools,
where religion will influence the education they receive. The point might well be made, Jus-
tice Rehnquist continued, that if a state must pay individuals such as Thomas and Sherbert
to prevent them from being prejudiced financially for following the dictates of their religion,
the Constitution also must require a state to provide financial assistance to parochial
schools, because for a state to refuse to do so would prejudice those children whose religion
requires them to attend such schools. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Court not only
has not held that the free exercise clause requires payments for children to go to parochial
schools, but also that it often has ruled that a state that voluntarily makes such payments
violates the establishment clause. See id. at 725-27.
I am quite sympathetic to Justice Rehnquist's suggestion. See Choper, The Establish-
ment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 260, 270 n.59 (1968). Justice
Rehnquist also said, however, that a state, if it wished, could give an individual such as
Sherbert or Thomas an exemption without violating the religion clauses because, even
though the state would be acting for a religious purpose, it merely would be "accommodat-
ing" the individual's religious choice rather than "inducing" it. 450 U.S. at 727. Although
950
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IV. BURGER COURT VACILLATIONS
The decisions just discussed indicate that the Burger Court has
interpreted the free exercise clause generously. This largess always
has had limits, however, and recent evidence suggests that the
Burger Court's benevolence may be substantially spent. In almost
every Term since the high-water mark for the free exercise clause
was reached in 1981,26 the Court has treated religious freedom
claims much less charitably. This Article, then, turns to the recent
decisions in which the Court has found adequate government in-
terests under the free exercise clause-that is, interests great
enough to survive "strict scrutiny"-when religiously dictated ac-
tions and neutral government regulations have clashed.
As is often true in life, two major areas of concern in recent deci-
sions have involved war and taxes. As for war, the Court in Gillette
v. United States27 repeated the oft-stated dictum that the govern-
ment's strong interest in national security does not require an ex-
emption from the draft for people opposed on religious grounds.28
As for taxes, the Court in United States v. Lee29 upheld the appli-
cation of the Social Security tax to members of the Old Order
Amish faith.30
this comes very close to my view, I disagree with Justice Rehnquist on the facts of Thomas
and Sherbert because, in those situations, religious freedom had been induced (or coerced)
and not merely accommodated. By exempting Sherbert or Thomas from the requirements of
the state law at issue in each of those cases, their states would be using tax funds for reli-
gious purposes. Unemployment compensation funds are compulsorily raised, and the fact
that they have been paid by the individual does not differentiate them from any other gov-
ernment funds, which also have been paid in taxes by the individual. Using compulsorily
raised funds to advance religious purposes would infringe the conscientious beliefs of the
taxpayers who contributed to those funds.
For example, suppose someone says: "My church is located three miles from my home. I
would like to ride a bus to church, but I can't afford the fare on the municipal bus system. I
think the government ought to waive the fare for me to go to church." Under Justice Rehn-
quist's rationale, if a municipally-owned bus company wanted to waive the fare to take peo-
ple to churches, it could do so. According to Justice Rehnquist, the waiver would not "in-
duce" religion, but would simply "accommodate" a religious choice that already had been
made. That may be true, but the waiver also would result in what the religion clauses pro-
tect against-the use of tax funds for exclusively religious purposes.
26. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); supra note 25.
27. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
28. Id. at 461-62.
29. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
30. See id. at 258-61.
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The decision in Lee was particularly significant because of its
factual similarity to Yoder. In Lee, a member of the Old Order
Amish employed several other members of that religion in his busi-
ness. The employer had refused to pay Social Security taxes on his
employees' wages.31 Because of a literal interpretation of the Bible,
the Amish sincerely believe that a failure to provide for their own
aged would be a sin. As a consequence, the Amish forbid both the
paying of Social Security taxes, which ultimately are used for gov-
ernment care of the elderly, and the receipt of Social Security ben-
efits.2 The Court stated that, under these circumstances, the issue
was whether requiring the Amish to pay-or whether refusing to
grant them an exemption-"is essential to accomplishing an over-
riding governmental interest."33 The Court unanimously held that
it was, and therefore that the failure to grant an exemption did not
violate the free exercise clause. 4
The result in Lee is problematic under the standard of strict
scrutiny. The Court's first justification was that mandatory partici-
pation in the Social Security system is indispensable to the sys-
tem's fiscal vitality.3 5 At first blush, that is a perfectly plausible
position, given the well known financial problems of the Social Se-
curity system and the efforts to get greater participation to help
solve these difficulties. The Court did cite some statements from
congressional reports to this effect," but it certainly did not give
the matter much scrutiny. Recall that the Amish religion forbids
not merely the payment of Social Security taxes, but also the re-
ceipt of Social Security benefits.3 7 In light of this fact, Justice Ste-
vens persuasively contended in his separate concurrence that an
exemption from both ends of the transaction for the Amish proba-
bly would save the government money in the long run.3 8
Problems also arise with respect to the Court's second justifica-
tion, the lack of any principled way to distinguish Lee from cases
31. Id. at 254.
32. Id. at 257.
33. Id. at 257-58.
34. See id. at 258-61.
35. Id. at 258.
36. See id.
37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
38. 455 U.S. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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in which people have claimed religious exemptions from other
taxes. In many instances, for example, courts denied exemptions to
people who refused to pay a large proportion of their income tax
because the proceeds of this tax go to support the Defense Depart-
ment and they were religiously opposed to war.3 9 Such cases, how-
ever, are quite easily distinguishable from Lee. In Lee, nothing in-
dicated that an exemption for the Amish would have caused the
Social Security system to suffer any net diminution of revenues.
The Amish refused to pay in, but they also refused to take out.
The same thing cannot be said when individuals withhold a fixed
portion of their income taxes because that portion of the national
budget goes for defense and those individuals are religiously op-
posed to war. In this situation, the government may well have a
compelling interest in mandatory participation in the income tax
system, because mandatory participation is necessary to the fiscal
integrity of the government. That compelling interest, however,
was not present in Lee.
The highly questionable result in Lee indicates the justices' dis-
comfort with their own doctrine, which grants a very special right
to people who claim exemption from secular government regula-
tions because of their religious beliefs. The Court appeared to
make clear in Lee that, in addition to war, it was going to draw a
line at taxes, even though this position was very hard to justify
under its doctrine.
In 1983, the Court produced a third example of a government
interest strong enough to override a free exercise claim. Bob Jones
University v. United States40 involved the denial of tax exempt
status to several private schools because they engaged in racial dis-
crimination.4 1 The Court-without dissent on this point-agreed
that there was a "compelling governmental interest" in eradicating
racial discrimination in education, and that the government had
"no 'less restrictive means' . . . available to achieve" that goal.42
39. See, e.g., First v. United States, 547 F.2d 45, 46 (7th Cir. 1976); Autenreith v. Cullen,
418 F.2d 586, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970).
40. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
41. Id. at 583. One of the private schools had religious beliefs that required racial discrim-
ination in admissions, while another had religious beliefs that barred any interracial dating
or interracial marriage by students. Id. at 580.
42. Id. at 604.
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The justices concluded, therefore, that the government's denial of
tax exempt status to these schools did not violate the free exercise
clause. Thus, after Bob Jones University, the Burger Court had
identified three major government interests that will survive free
exercise clause challenges: war, taxes, and the national policy
against racial discrimination.43
Two rulings, subsequent to Bob Jones University but prior to
the Burger Court's final Term, further indicate the justices' greatly
reduced enthusiasm for the "strict scrutiny" approach. Although
the first decision, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.," did not di-
rectly implicate the free exercise clause, it is suggestive of the
Court's attitude. Thornton involved a Connecticut statute that re-
quired private employers to give employees a day off on their Sab-
bath, regardless of the burden or inconvenience either to the em-
ployer or to other employees. 45 In a nearly unanimous decision, the
Court held that this statute violated the establishment clause.46
The Court reasoned that the law advanced a "particular religious
practice," and that its grant of an "absolute and unqualified right
not to work" abridged the constitutional separation of church and
state.47
The purpose of the Connecticut statute plainly was religious, as
were the actions required of Wisconsin and South Carolina by the
Court in Yoder and Sherbert. Under my proposed approach, how-
ever, a religious purpose alone is not enough to trigger a violation
of the establishment clause. The state action also must pose some
meaningful danger to religious liberty. Because the opportunity to
be excused from work on one's Sabbath would neither coerce nor
influence people to join any religion or a particular religion, and
43. Although I agree that the strict scrutiny test developed in Sherbert and Yoder by no
means dictates the result reached in rather conclusory fashion by the Court in Bob Jones
University, see Freed & Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy: Bob Jones University v.
United States, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 20-30, I am in accord with the Court's ruling. If the
government were to waive denial of tax exempt status only for those private schools whose
racially discriminatory practices were founded on religious beliefs, this would result in the
use of tax funds for religious purposes, and therefore should be held to violate the establish-
ment clause.
44. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
45. Id. at 2914-15.
46. Id. at 2918.
47. Id.
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because no use of tax funds for religious purposes was involved, no
danger to religious freedom was posed. As a result, the Connecticut
statute should be viewed simply as an attempt to accommodate
religion, and not as a violation of the establishment clause. The
statute certainly imposed a potential cost on employers and em-
ployees-a burden or inconvenience to accommodate the religious
beliefs of certain fellow workers. As long as the statute did not co-
erce, compromise, or influence religious choice, however, it should
not have been found violative of the establishment clause.
The Court's second decision, Quaring v. Peterson,48 appeared
even more threatening to the future vitality of the free exercise
clause; indeed, it could fairly be described as a potential coup de
grace. That case involved a Nebraska rule requiring photographs
on all driver's licenses, as applied to a person who sincerely be-
lieved that the Second Commandment's prohibition of "graven
images" forbade her to be photographed. 49  The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Nebraska's re-
fusal to grant a religious exemption from this rule violated the free
exercise clause. 50 The Supreme Court granted certiorari but, with
Justice Powell not participating, it affirmed by an equally divided
Court, without opinion.51
Any reasonable application of the "strict scrutiny" test would
produce a result vindicating the free exercise claim in Quaring.
From the claimant's standpoint, the burden of. not having a
driver's license obviously was substantial, given the need to have- a
driver's license for employment purposes and other essential activ-
ities. Although the State's interest could not be characterized as
frivolous, on the other hand, it surely could not be viewed as any-
thing more than quite modest. For example, some states, including
New York, have managed to find rapid means of indentification
other than a driver's license photograph. The fact that four justices
of the Supreme Court would reject the free exercise claim in Quar-
ing, therefore, boded poorly for robust enforcement of the free ex-
ercise clause in the future.
48. 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (per curiam).
49. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1123 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided
Court per curiam sub. nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
50. Id. at 1125.
51. 472 U.S. at 478.
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The product of the Burger Court's final Term, however, flashed
a contrary signal. The question presented in Goldman v. Wein-
berger,52 whether the Air Force may prohibit an Orthodox Jewish
psychologist from wearing a yarmulke while in uniform on duty at
a military hospital, 53 seemed answerable only in favor of the indi-
vidual under the test of "strict scrutiny." Although a narrowly di-
vided Court rejected the free exercise claim, it did so by putting
the case in a special "military affairs" category,54 which greatly
limited the decision's more general precedential force. Of greater
consequence for the continued vitality of the free exercise clause
was a majority's invocation of the strict scrutiny approach in
Bowen v. Roy5 5 in holding that a person whose sincere Native
American religious beliefs forbade the use of Social Security num-
bers was entitled to an exemption from the requirement that recip-
ients of food stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children
furnish their Social Security numbers. 5 The fact that Justice
O'Connor, who would have sustained the free exercise claim in
Goldman, authored the prevailing opinion in Roy may be of partic-
ular significance in the years ahead.
V. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS THAT EXPRESSLY DEAL WITH RELIGION
A. Laws That Treat Religion Adversely
Another kind of government action that raises serious problems
under the free exercise clause is a regulation that explicitly singles
out a particular religion, or religion generally, for adverse treat-
ment. For example, an ordinance that required Catholics to stay
52. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
53. Id. at 1311.
54. See, e.g, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
55. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
56. The district court found that an exemption in cases of this kind "would require no
modifications to the. . . [government's] computer systems, would require at the most some
minor extra expenditures of time by . . . [government] employees and would require no
discrete financial expenditure," and that the government's "interest in maintaining an effi-
cient and fraud resistant system can be met without requiring use of a social security num-
ber" for the claimant. Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. 600, 607 (M.D. Pa. 1984), vacated sub
nom. Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
Consistent with my position in Sherbert and Thomas, I believe that the exemption re-
quired by the Court in Roy violates the establishment clause because it involves the use of
tax funds to promote religious purposes.
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off the streets, or forbade people from attending the church of
their choice, would fall into this category. The Burger Court deci-
sion that best illustrates the proposition that such laws almost al-
ways are forbidden is McDaniel v. Paty,7 which involved a Ten-
nessee statute that disqualified clergy from either serving in the
legislature or acting as delegates to a state constitutional conven-
tion.58 Statutes that on their face put one or all religions in a dis-
advantageous position are quite unusual. McDaniel is important
not so much for the Court's rationale, which was muddled by sev-
eral opinions, but rather for the Court's unanimous finding that
the law was invalid.59
B. Laws That Prefer Some Religions Over Others
Government action that expressly deals with the subject of reli-
gion and effectively grants a preference among religious faiths also
raises problems under the free exercise clause. The leading case is
Larson v. Valente6 0 That case involved a Minnesota statute that
imposed registration and reporting requirements on charitable or-
ganizations to prevent fraudulent solicitations and related abuses,
but that exempted religious organizations that solicited more than
fifty percent of their funds from their members. 1 The effect of this
statute was to exempt the Catholic Church from the onerous regis-
tration and reporting requirements, because it raised more than
half of its money from its members, but not to exempt the Unifica-
tion Church, the followers of the Reverend Moon, because it solic-
ited more than half of its funds from nonmembers.62 The Court
held that the Minnesota statute violated the establishment
clause,63 relying on a famous dictum in Everson v. Board of
57. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
58. Id. at 621.
59. Id. at 629.
60. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
61. Id. at 231-32.
62. Id. at 234.
63. Id. at 246.
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Education 64 that the establishment clause bars the preference of
one religion over another. 5
Larson should be seen as a free exercise clause decision parading
in an establishment clause disguise. This criticism of the basis for
the Court's ruling is not just caused by a sense of aesthetics;
rather, it further illustrates the confusion that the Court has cre-
ated with respect to establishment clause and free exercise clause
doctrine. Regardless of the historical relevance that the establish-
ment clause may have had with respect to official governmental
designation of a particular religious denomination for special treat-
ment, the Court admitted in Larson that its modern three-prong
establishment clause test was not really fashioned for the problem
of discrimination or preference among religions. Rather, the Court
correctly observed that its establishment clause analysis mainly
has been concerned with aid to religion generally.6 In fact, the
Court in Larson virtually ignored the purpose and effect prongs of
the three-prong test, although it did throw in the entanglement
prong at the end of the opinion.6 7 The Court reasoned that al-
lowing laws to discriminate among religions would produce
politicization of religion, pointing to evidence in Larson that
showed some real effort in the Minnesota legislature to ensure that
the Catholic Church was not subject to the reporting and registra-
tion requirements but that the Unification Church was.6 8
The major thrust of the Court's opinion, however, involved using
what had become the classic free exercise clause analysis, conced-
ing that discrimination among religions "is inextricably connected
with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause." 69 The
Court actually held that discrimination among religions must
64. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
65. Id. at 15. Everson, the Supreme Court's first major establishment clause decision, was
decided a quarter century before the Burger Court developed its three-part test for estab-
lishment clause problems in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor prohibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive governmental entanglement with religion.'" (citation omitted)).
66. 456 U.S. at 252.
67. See id. at 252-53.
68. Id. at 254.
69. Id. at 245.
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survive strict scrutiny. 0 Larson was an easy case under this free
exercise clause/strict scrutiny analysis. The Court was willing to
assume that the State had a "compelling" interest in preventing
fraudulent solicitation of the public.7 1 Strict scrutiny, however, also
requires the state to have had no narrower means available, and
the Court felt that the "fifty percent rule" was neither necessary
nor "closely fitted" to achieving the state goal.7 2 Therefore, the
Court held the law invalid.
The dissenting justices in Larson did not really dispute this ap-
plication of the doctrine to the facts. Rather, the burden of the
dissenting opinion's argument was that the Court's test was too
stringent. Moreover, although Justice White did not put it quite
this way, he essentially agreed with the point, suggested above,
that the majority had imported a free exercise clause test into an
establishment clause case. In my view, however, the Court's mis-
step was in viewing the challenge in Larson as raising an establish-
ment clause issue to begin with.
The major disagreement between the majority and dissent con-
cerned whether this law discriminated among religions or simply
was a neutral law with a disparate impact on different religious
groups. The Court adopted the former view. Justice White argued
in his dissent, however, that the Minnesota law did not explicitly
distinguish between religions. 3 He pointed out that the law named
no churches. Rather, it stated general, neutral" characteristics
describing which religions would be exempt and which would not.7 4
To agree with the dissent's analysis that this law did not explic-
itly distinguish between religious sects, however, is not to say how
the law should have been treated. Although the Minnesota statute
did not specifically give preference to some religions over others, it
did expressly deal with the subject of religion, and it resulted in
favoring some and disfavoring others. In my view, it should have
been as vulnerable-that is, subject to the same level of scru-
tiny-as a general, neutral law that says nothing about religion but
70. Id. at 246.
71. Id. at 248.
72. Id. at 251.
73. Id. at 261-62 (White, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
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that happens to have an adverse impact on some faiths, like the
Wisconsin compulsory education law at issue in Yoder.
The problem is that when the Court has invoked the establish-
ment clause, it has applied a much more lenient test to laws that
expressly deal with religion and subject some faiths to discrimina-
tory treatment than it has applied under the free exercise clause to
general, neutral laws that come into conflict with religious beliefs.
In Gillette v. United States,7 5 for example, the Court applied a
less stringent test to a provision in the Selective Service Act that
exempted from the draft individuals who, because of religious
training and belief, were opposed to "war in any form," but did not
exempt individuals who were opposed only to "unjust wars. 1 6 The
Court reasoned that this law did not discriminate on the basis of
religious affiliation. That is true. The Selective Service Act did not
say, for example, that Quakers are exempt and Catholics are not.
The law, however, did plainly discriminate on the basis of the kind
of religious beliefs one had-beliefs opposed to all wars rather than
beliefs opposed only to unjust wars.
In Gillette, the Court treated the "gist of the constitutional com-
plaint" as falling under the establishment clause. 7 The Court
characterized the statute as a neutral law with a disparate impact,
and ruled that as long as Congress had a "valid secular reason" for
the law, that law could survive an establishment clause challenge.7 8
The Court readily found a valid secular basis-ease of administra-
tion of the draft system. Thus, the Court found no violation of the
establishment clause despite the law's discrimination among reli-
gious beliefs. 9
Given the Court's contemporary doctrinal treatment of the reli-
gion clauses, Gillette may be viewed more helpfully as a free exer-
cise case. And, employing a free exercise clause analysis, the Court
may well have decided the case correctly. In reality, the Court did
not sustain the draft law merely on the basis of some valid secular
purpose. If that were all that the Court had required in Larson, for
example, it would have had no problem upholding the Minnesota
75. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
76. Id. at 440.
77. Id. at 449.
78. Id. at 454-60.
79. Id. at 462.
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statute challenged in that case. Surely some secular basis is availa-
ble to distinguish between groups that raise more than fifty per-
cent of their funds from the outside and groups that do not. The
religious organizations in the former category reasonably may be
thought to pose a greater danger of fraud, which may not provide
compelling justification for the classification, but which does re-
present some valid neutral basis for it.
In reality, I believe that the Selective Service Act survived strict
scrutiny in Gillette. The powerful government interest in raising
an army and the difficulties in administering a draft exemption
based on "just war" beliefs may well have justified the conclusion
that the statutory discrimination among religious beliefs was based
on a compelling or essential or overriding government interest.80
In sum, the doctrine in Gillette, that a valid secular basis for de
facto religious discrimination is enough to sustain it under the es-
tablishment clause, plainly supports Justice White's dissent in
Larson. The Gillette doctrine, however, effectively has been aban-
doned, and rightly so. Laws that explicitly deal with the subject of
religion, and result in a preference of some religions over others,
fall into a separate category of government action that ought to be
treated under the free exercise clause. Although the Court in Lar-
son did not purport to analyze the statute in that case under the
free exercise clause, it explicitly employed a rationale that does.
Both the result and most of the rationale in that case, therefore,
were eminently sensible.
80. But cf. Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Ob-
jection, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 31, 68-82.
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